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     A recent spike in pricing of prescription drugs has sparked public concern.1
The price of medication has been rising steadily in recent years, including a 
few high-profile examples of drastic price increases.2  As a result, the U.S. 
spent $450 billion on prescription drugs in 2016, an increase of 5.8 percent 
from 2015.3 Maryland residents spent upwards of six billion dollars on 
prescription drugs in 2016.4   
     The continued rising cost of prescription drugs is an issue that hits home 
for many Americans, with forty nine percent nationwide reporting they took a 
prescription drug within the last thirty days.5  Prices of popular drugs like 
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1 Inmaculada Hernandez et al., The Contribution of New Product Entry Versus 
Existing Product Inflation In The Rising Costs of Drugs, HEALTH AFFAIRS 76(January,
2019), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cutler/files/hlthaff.2018.05147.pdf. 
2 Aaron S. Kesslheim, MD, JD, MPH, Jerry Avron, MD, Ameet Sarptwari, JD, 
PhD, The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and 
Prospects for Reform, JAMA (last visited April 19, 2019), https://phhp-
bahealthscience-new.sites.medinfo.ufl.edu/files/2016/09/jsc1600151.pdf; See
generally Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 18, 2017 5:20 PM), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-price-
raises-protests.html.
3 Bill Berkrot, U.S. Prescription Drug Spending as High as $610 Billion by 2021,
REUTERS (May 4, 2017 12:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
drugspending-quintilesims/u-s-prescription-drug-spending-as-high-as-610-billion-
by-2021-report-idUSKBN1800BU  
4 Total Sales for Prescription Drugs Filled at Pharmacies: Maryland, KISER FAMILY






5 Katie Beyer, Drug Money Part 2: A Look at 2017 State Legislative Efforts to Reduce 
Prescription Drug Prices, THE SOURCE BLOG ON HEALTH CARE (Aug. 3, 2017), 
insulin tripled between 2002 and 2013.6  Similarly, the price for an EpiPen has 
risen 500 percent since 2007.7
      In 2017, Maryland joined forty-three other states’ that have enacted 
legislation aimed at combating high drug prices by introducing House Bill 631 
(“HB631”).8 In an attempt to address the concern in the rising costs of 
prescription drugs, Maryland enacted the Essential Off-Patent or Generic Drug 
Price Gouging Prohibition Act (“MD Price-Gouging Act”), which prohibits 
price gouging of “essential off-patent or generic drugs.”9  In the bill, price 
gouging is defined as “any unconscionable increase in the price of a generic 
prescription drug sold in Maryland that is not justified by the cost of 
production or expansion of access and results in no meaningful choice for 
customers to purchase the drug.”10  The law specifically attempted to target 
manufacturers who have historically hiked the prices of generic drugs with no 
market competition.11  Companies manufacturing new drugs would not be 
included, nor would a majority of generic drug manufacturers who have 
participated in competitive markets to help drive their prices down.12
     This comment will address the issue of rising prescription drugs costs, and 
explore Maryland’s recent attempt at combating high drug prices.  Part II will 
analyze the M.D. Price-Gouging Act and how it attempted to combat the issue 
of rising off-patent drug prices. Part III explains how the high cost of 
prescription drugs is affecting Maryland consumers, as well as the recent 
litigation over the Prohibition Against Price Gouging for Essential off-Patent 
or Generic Drugs (herin after “the Maryland Price Gouging Act”). Finally, Part 
IV will first discuss potential federal solutions, and then it will advocate for 
amending the MD Price-Gouging Act to compel companies to notify the state 
of impending price increases.  
http://sourceonhealthcare.org/drug-money-part-2-a-look-at-2017-state-legislative-
efforts-to-reduce-prescription-drug-prices/#_ftn5.  





9 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-803 (LexisNexis 2017). 
10 Id. at § 2-801 (f). 
11 Id. 
12 Jeremy A. Green, MD, PhD & William V. Padula, PhD, Targeting Unconscionable 
Prescription-Drug Prices – Maryland’s Anti-Price-Gouging Law, NEW ENGLAND
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE (October 14, 2017 3:20 PM) 
https://catalyst.nejm.org/marylands-anti-price-gouging-law/. 
A. Current Law in Maryland
     The Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) was implemented in 
1973 to provide a private cause of action for consumers harmed by unfair and 
deceptive trade practices.13  To this day, the MCPA is the only current 
protection for Maryland residents regarding prescription drug prices.  The 
stated intent of the MCPA is to “provide minimum standards for the protection 
of consumers in the State.”14  Mainly, the MCPA protects against unfair or 
deceptive trade practices such as “any false, falsely disparaging, or misleading 
oral or written statement, visual depiction, or other representation of any kind, 
which has the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading 
consumers.”15
     Unfortunately, the MCPA falls short of protecting Maryland consumers 
from skyrocketing prescription drug prices. A 2010 audit of the MCPA by the 
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DHMH”) discovered 
that the Act did not ensure that pricing information of drugs was reasonable.16
While the DHMH audit did acknowledge that drug prices are comprised of 
various components, they discovered that Pennsylvania’s Medicaid Program 
contracted three different vendors to assess the reasonableness of drug 
prices.17  Furthermore, the audit found that the company used by the MCPA to 
obtain pricing data recently settled a lawsuit, and was involved in litigation 
with several entities that allege it colluded with a drug manufacturer to inflate 
drug prices.18
     The DHMH ultimately recommended that the MCPA identify measures to 
ensure pricing data is evaluated and compared to other prices for 
reasonableness.19 The reasonableness comparison was added in an attempt to 
make the law more enforceable against price increases; however, it still did 
not do enough. Maryland’s recent attempt at legislation attempted to combat 
this issue head on, though it fell short of this goal.  
13 See generally MD. CODE ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW § 13-301 (LexisNexis 2017). 
14 MD. CODE ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW § 13-103 (a) (LexisNexis 2017). 
15 Id. at § 13-301. 
16 See generally MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITS,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE MEDICAL CARE ASSISTANCE




B. Senate Panel Investigates Four Pharmaceutical Companies
      In 2011, Maryland Congressman Elijah Cummings led an effort to release 
congressional reports on pharmaceutical pricing.20  In direct response to 
several independent reports, Congressmen Cummings spearheaded an 
investigation into drug speculation practices of five companies alleged to be 
raising prices of drugs in critically short supply.21  These reports were 
precursors to the more recent reports focused on off-patent drug pricing. 
     The first report, entitled “Sudden Price Spikes in Off-Patent Prescription 
Drugs: The Monopoly Business Model that Harms Patients, Taxpayers, and 
the U.S. Health Care System,” was issued by the U.S. Senate’s bipartisan 
Special Committee on Aging.22  The report was the product of a Senate 
investigation of “abrupt and dramatic price increases in prescription drugs 
whose patents had expired long ago.”23   
     The committee evaluated four companies: Turing Pharmaceuticals; 
Retrophin, Inc.; Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.; and Rodelis 
Therapeutics.  All recently purchased decades-old off-patent drugs, and raised 
the prices suddenly.24  The report describes a business model in which 
companies produce a drug serving a small market as the only manufacturer to 
ensure the drug is the best on the market for the condition it treats.25  This 
controls access to the drug and allows the companies to engage in “price 
gouging” by increasing prices as high as possible.26  The report further 
provided illustrations such as Retrophin’s increase of Thiola, a kidney 
20 Cummings Investigates Potential Prescription Drug Price Gouging, HOUSE 
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM (March 6, 2018), 
https://democrats-oversight.house.gov/cummings-investigates-potential-prescription-
drug-price-gouging. 
21Id.; See also Coleen Cherici, Patrick McGinnis, Wayne Russell, Buyer beware: Drug 
shortages and the gray market, PREMIER HEALTHCARE ALLIANCE (last visited April 
18, 2019), http://www.anco-online.org/GrayMarketAnalysis-Premier.pdf; ISMP 
Survey on Drug Shortage “Gray Market” Shows Widespread Impact on Hospitals, 
INSTITUTE FOR SAFE MEDICATION PRACTICES (Aug. 25, 2011),
https://forms.ismp.org/pressroom/PR20110825.pdf. 
22 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON AGING, 114TH CONG., SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES IN OFF-PATENT
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: THE MONOPOLY BUSINESS MODEL THAT HARMS PATIENTS,
TAXPAYERS, AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Comm. Print 2016). 
23 Id. at 3. 
24 Id. (mentioning that Retrophin has appeared to reverse this business model after Mr. 
Shkreli). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 4.  
medicine, from $1.50 to $30.00 per pill, and Rodelis’s price increase of 30 
capsules of Seromycin, a tuberculosis medication, from $500 to $10,800.27
     The second report was issued by the Government Accountability Office 
and studied a group of 1,441 established generic drugs.28  The study found that 
between 2010 and 2015, manufacturers had imposed at least one 
“extraordinary price increase” for over 300 of those drugs.29  Additionally, of 
those drugs, forty-eight had increases of 500 percent or higher, and fifteen had 
increases of 1000 percent or higher.30
C. Essential Generic Drug Price-Gouging Prohibition
     In response to these reports, HB631 was introduced in early 2017, passing 
both houses of the Maryland General Assembly by large bipartisan majorities. 
The Governor of Maryland, Larry Hogan, declined to sign the bill, citing 
constitutional issues.31
     The MD Price Gouging Act has two primary functions. First, it prohibits 
manufacturers or wholesale distributors from engaging in price gouging in the 
sale of an “essential off-patent or generic drug.”32  Under the act, an essential 
off-patent or generic drug is any prescription drug free from “exclusive 
marketing rights under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, that appears 
on the World Health Organization’s model list of essential medicines or is 
designated by the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene as an essential 
medicine.”33 The act additionally requires generic drugs be actively marketed 
in the United States by three or fewer manufacturers and be available for sale 
in Maryland.34
      “Price gouging” is an unconscionable increase in the price of a prescription 
drug.35  “Unconscionable Increase” refers to an increase in the price of a 
prescription drug that is: 
27 Id. at 4-6.  
28 Generic Drugs Under Medicare, Comp. Gen., 1, 14 (2016). 
29 Id.
30 Id. 
31 Letter from Gov. Larry Hogan, Governor of Md., to Hon. Michael E. Busch, Md. 
Speaker of the House (May 26, 2016) (stating the bill could have dormant commerce 
and 14th Am. due process issues.). 
32 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-802 (LexisNexis 2017) (repealed 2018). 
33 Id. at § 2-801. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
(1) excessive and not justified by the cost of producing the
drug or the cost of appropriate expansion of access to the drug
and (2) results in consumers having no meaningful choice of
whether or not to purchase the drug at a higher price due to
the importance of the drug to their health and lack of market
competition.36
     A wholesale distributor may increase the price of an essential generic drug 
if the price increase is directly attributable to additional costs for the drug 
imposed on the wholesale distributor.37
     The second primary function of the act is to authorize the Maryland 
Medical Assistance Program (“MMAP”) to notify the Attorney General 
(“AG”) of any price increase.38  First, MAAP allows the AG to be notified 
when the price increase (by itself or in combination with other price increases) 
would result in an increase of fifty percent or more in the wholesale acquisition 
cost of the drug within the preceding one-year period, or the price paid by 
Medicaid for the drug within the preceding one year period.39  Additionally, 
MMAP may notify the AG of the price increase in one of three situations. 
First, if a thirty-day supply of the maximum recommended dosage, according 
to the label for the drug approved under FDCA, would cost over $80 at the 
drugs wholesale acquisition cost.40  Second, The AG may also be notified if a 
full course of treatment of the drug approved under FDCA, would cost more 
than $80 at the drugs wholesale acquisition cost.41  Finally, if the drug is made 
available to consumers only in quantities that do not include a thirty-day 
supply, a full course of treatment, or a single dose, and it would cost more than 
$80 at the drug’s wholesale acquisition cost to obtain a 30-day supply or a full 
course treatment.42
     The advantages of Maryland’s The MD Price Gouging Act showed a stark 
contrast to those of the MCPA.  Advocates celebrated the increased discretion 
for the Maryland Attorney General to sue companies for unwarranted price 
hikes.43  Additional advantages include the AG’s ability to reverse price hikes, 
impose fines on the companies said to violate to law and return some funds to 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at § 2-802. 





43 Diane Archer, Maryland law protects people from prescription drug price gouging, 
JUST CARE (June 14, 2017), http://justcareusa.org/maryland-law-protects-people-
from-prescription-drug-price-gouging/. 
consumers taking the drugs who have been victims of the price hikes.44  Some 
critics viewed the AG’s new powers as roll back of his previous abilities, 
because it limits the power to act only for non-competitive drugs and stipulates 
that companies must be given time to correct the price hike.45  Regardless, 
these new provisions could have allowed for meaningful punishments for drug 
companies who unnecessarily hike their prices, and also provide some 
monetary relief for patients who suffer from these price hikes.  
     On the other hand, many opponents to the law have leaned on the idea that 
the law simply was not definitive enough to allow manufacturers to know 
when they have violated the law. In their reply brief, the Association for 
Affordable Medicines (“AAM”) notes that appellee’s have not once given a 
straight answer as to whether even a ten percent increase would be 
“unconscionable”.46 This disadvantages companies affected by the law 
because it decreases the incentive for competition in the market, which only 
drives prices higher, creating the ability for more companies to violate the 
law.47   
A. Challenges to the Prohibition Against Price Gouging for Essential
Off-Patent or Generic Drugs
     Maryland’s groundbreaking law came with some major pushback.48
Shortly after its passage in July of 2017, the AAM filed a complaint seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief to bar the enactment of the law.49  In response, 
the Attorney General for Maryland moved to dismiss the claim.50   
44 Id. 
45 Green & Padula, supra note 12. 
46 Reply Brief for Appellant at 19, Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 
(D. Md. 2017)(No. 17-2166), 2017 WL 6402860, at *19. 
47 Green & Padula, supra note 12. 
48 See generally Erin Cox, Drug Firms Challenge Maryland’s price-gouging law, THE 
BALTIMORE SUN (December 27, 2017)
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-price-gouging-suit-
20170706-story.html; Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860 (D. Md. 
September 29, 2017). 
49 See generally Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, (D. Md. 
Jul. 6, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-1860), 2017 WL 2884401. 
50 See generally Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. 17-
1860-MJG (D. Md. 2017), 2017 WL 9438490. 
     The initial hurdle arose when the bill first came across Governor Larry 
Hogan’s desk.51  The Governor believed the bill did not do enough to protect 
all drug pricing, while at the same time citing the same constitutional issues 
found in plaintiff’s complaint.52  According to Governor Hogan, the legislation 
did nothing to address the rising cost of patented products and “medical 
devices which may be associated with drug delivery.”53  He argued that the 
bill should do more for patented drugs, since they make up a significant portion 
of the market.54  Ultimately, he refused to sign it, but allowed it to become law 
after expressing his concerns.55
     Plaintiff’s complaint raised two primary causes of action.56  AAM first 
alleged HB 631 is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because the 
State of Maryland is discriminating against interstate commerce.57  The 
primary purpose of the Commerce Clause is to regulate “commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States;” however, it also prohibits 
states from discriminating against interstate commerce.58   
     The long established “dormant command” in the Commerce Clause 
prohibits each state from regulating extraterritorial economic activity.59 The 
Supreme Court has long viewed the Commerce Clause as “an implicit restraint 
on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute.”60  The 
primary factor used in determining if a statute violates the commerce clause 
“is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond 
the boundaries of the State.”61   
     Ultimately, AAM alleged HB 631 violates two well established precedents. 
First, a state law which regulates commercial activity occurring completely 
outside of the State’s borders exceeds the limits of State’s authority and will 
generally not succeed “whether or not the regulated commerce has effects 





56 See generally Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj, Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, (D. Md. 
Jul. 6, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-1860), 2017 WL 2884401. 
57 Id.
58 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
59 Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 6.; Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 
175, 179 (1995).
60 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 338 (2007); See also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power 
… [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.”). 
61 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
within the State.”62  Similarly, AAM further argued that a State may not 
attempt to control the price of a good within its borders by regulating the price 
of transactions that occur outside of the State.63   
     AAM stated that HB 631 violates the Commerce Clause because it attempts 
to directly regulate prices for transactions, which sometimes largely occur 
outside of the state.64  The bill is not limited to commerce that occurs within 
Maryland, or even sales that occur between an entity outside of Maryland and 
an entity within it.65  Instead, it prohibits generic drug manufacturers and 
wholesale distributors from “unconscionably” raising the price of any of their 
essential generic drug that is available for sale in the State, even if the 
manufacturer or wholesale distributor never directly dealt with a consumer 
residing in the State.66
     AAM particularly takes issue with the extra territorial reach of HB 631. 
Manufacturers sell the majority of off patent and generic prescription drugs to 
either large wholesalers or large retail pharmacy chains that warehouse their 
own drugs.67  However, of the three largest wholesalers in the country, which 
account for ninety percent of the national wholesale market, none reside in 
Maryland.68  Only one of the nation’s twenty largest generic drug 
manufactures is headquartered in Maryland, and none of them actually 
manufacture drugs in the state.69  AAM’s argues that a large portion of off-
patent and generic prescription drugs are only made available for sale in the 
State of Maryland under specific circumstances.70   
     In AAM’s view, HB 631 represented an overreach by the Maryland State 
legislature which is forbidden by the Dormant Commerce Clause.71
Manufacturers and wholesalers can violate the terms of the law even if they 
engage in no direct commercial activity in Maryland at all, because they don’t 
sell directly to Maryland consumers.72  This discourages companies from 
62 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. 
63 See generally Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (“[A] State 
may not adopt legislation that has the practical effect of establishing ‘a scale of prices 
for use in other states.’”). 
64 Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 9. 
65 Id.
66 Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 9; § 2-801(b)(1)(iv); § 2-803(g). 
67 Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 9. 
68 Id. at 10; RxCommercial Research International, Inc., Investing into BioPharma 
Products in the USA (Color): A Reference Guide 156 (2012). 
69 Id.
70 Id. (Explain process for how to sell drugs in MD #52 Complaint.). 
71 Id.
72 Id.
conducting commerce outside of Maryland due to the potential liability they 
will face in the state, even for sales that occur outside of the state.73  AAM’s 
motion argued that the law has the practical effect of establishing “a scale of 
prices for use in other states,” and should be void.74
     AAM next contended that HB 631 should be held void for vagueness in 
accordance with the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause.75  The Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.”76  Laws that fail to inform a person of 
“ordinary intelligence” exactly what is prohibited violate this requirement of 
due process, and are void for vagueness.77  The Supreme Court has 
consistently held, “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an 
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning . . . violates the first essential of due process of law.78  Vague 
laws can have the effect of trapping innocent consumers by not providing fair 
warning.79  This requirement of clarity in regulation is essential to the 
protections provided by the Due Process Clause.80   
     AAM also alleged that HB 631 fails to provide a meaningful description of 
what its terms proscribe.81  Civil statutes will normally be deemed 
unconstitutionally vague only if the terms are “so vague and indefinite as really 
to be no rule or standard at all.”82  This standard requires that an economic 
legislation be invalidated if it does not at least establish minimal guidelines to 
govern officials or give reasonable notice of the conduct prohibited.83  HB 
631’s language prohibited price gouging, which it defines as “increase[ing] 
the price of a prescription drug” in a manner that is excessive and not cost-
justified, leaving consumers with no meaningful choice about whether to 
73 Id.; Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. District of Columbia, 406 F. Supp. 2d 56, 
70 (D.D.C. 2005). 
74 Id.
75 See generally Id.
76 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
77 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
78 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); See also FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (“A fundamental principle in 
our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice 
of conduct that is forbidden or required.”) 
79 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.  
80 See generally Connally, 269 U.S. at 391 (citing International Harvester Co. v. 
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221, 34 S. Ct. 853, 58 L. Ed. 1284 (1914); Collins v. 
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638, 34 S. Ct. 924, 58 L. Ed. 1510 (1914)). 
81 Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 11. 
82 Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs. v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602, 614 (2d Cir. 1996). 
83 Schleifer by Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 853 (4th Cir. 1998). 
purchase the drug at an excessive price.84  However, the bill provided no 
further guidance as to how to interpret or apply the provisions.  The law 
provided no way for manufacturers and wholesale distributors to determine 
whether a price is “excessive”, whether a price increase is “appropriate”, or 
whether a particular consumers options for medicine are “meaningful”.   
     Furthermore, AAM took issue with the broad powers given to the AG when 
deciding whether or not to launch an investigation or lawsuit.85  The definitions 
of the terms justified, appropriate, excessive, and meaningful are left entirely 
to the discretion of the AG.86  The AG was a vocal proponent of the bill, and 
AAM was concerned that the loose terminology gives the AG wide latitude 
for enforcement.87  The AG acknowledged AAM’s concerns but stated that his 
office “can only focus on the most egregious cases because of how the bill is 
written and limited resources.”88  This lack of clarity and direction of the AG’s 
enforcement created an issue concerning the potential monetary penalties 
associated with a violation of the law.89  Accordingly, AAM argued HB631 
failed to provide off-patent and generic drug companies “reasonable notice” 
of prohibited conduct and failed to establish “minimum guidelines to govern 
official’s exercise of discretion in implementing and enforcing it.90”
     AAM’s arguments hold some merit given case law on the commerce clause 
issue. In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling Inc., the Supreme Court invalidated a New 
York law that regulated an out-of-state transaction triggered by a sale 
occurring within the state.91  The act prohibited the sale of milk purchased 
outside of the state of New York unless the price paid to the out of state 
producers was similar to that of a transaction with an in-state producer.92  This 
law was passed in an effort to incentivize New York milk dealers to buy from 
in-state producers and was only triggered once the milk was actually sold in 
the state.93  In this case, the plaintiff was a New York milk dealer who 
84 Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 11; § 2-802(a); § 2-8021(f). 
85 Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 11. 
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Families USA, Prescription Drug Price Gouging: Maryland’s Landmark Law 
Protects Consumers (May 30, 2017). 
http://familiesusa.org/blog/2017/05/prescription-drug-price-gouging-maryland-
landmark-law-protects-consumers. 
89 Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 12, Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, (D. Md. Sept. 29, 
2017) (No. MJG-17-1860), 2017 WL 4347818. 
90 Id.
91 Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 511.  
92 Id. at 519.  
93 Id.  
purchased milk from a Vermont creamery, who got their milk from producers 
on Vermont farms.94  The Supreme Court determined the law violated the 
established commerce clause doctrine by effectively regulating the out of state 
price of milk sold in New York.95  The Court found that New York was 
essentially using an in-state hook, (i.e. sale of the milk in New York) to affect 
out of state conduct and pricing.96
     The New York act at issue in Baldwin has one major difference compared 
to Maryland’s law.  In Baldwin, violation of the act was triggered by an actual 
sale within the state of New York, otherwise known as an “as applied 
challenge.”97 In contrast, Maryland’s law is only effective if the drug is 
available for sale in Maryland but does not require an actual sale of the drug 
to trigger relief.98  In other words, the Maryland law is being challenged on its 
face as unconstitutional. Though the act at issue in Baldwin was ultimately 
unsuccessful, the analysis would be inapplicable to Maryland’s new law.  
B. Current Litigation
     In September of 2017, the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland heard arguments in the case Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh to 
address AAM’s constitutional challenges to HB 631.99  Specifically, the court 
examined whether or not the new law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause 
and the Fourteenth Amendment vagueness standard. 
     The court used a two-tiered analysis to determine whether a state statute 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.100  The first tier dictates that a state 
statute is usually struck down “without further inquiry” when it directly 
regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or favors in-state 
economic interests over out-of-state interests.101  When a statute “regulates 
even handedly”, the court moves to the second tier analysis, looking to 
“whether the State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate 
commerce clearly exceeds local benefits.”102  Additionally, recent Supreme 
94 Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 519.
95 Id.  
96 Id.
97 Id.  
98 § 2-801. 
99 Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 
2017). 
100 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 
106 S. Ct. 2080, 90 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1986); Star Scientific Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 
355 (4th Cir. 2002). 
101 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579. 
102 Id.
Court precedent has created a “third strand” of analysis, referred to as the 
“extraterritoriality principle”.103  This analysis is specifically applied to price 
control laws that control conduct outside of states borders.104
     The United States District Court for Maryland held that AAM did not allege 
a plausible Dormant Commerce Clause violation under the first tier or the 
“extraterritoriality principle.”105  AAM argued that HB 631 impermissibly 
regulates conduct occurring wholly outside of Maryland by controlling pricing 
of manufacturers and wholesalers who do not sell directly to actors in 
Maryland.106 According to the court, HB 631 limited its regulation to drug 
manufacturers or wholesalers selling off-patent or generic drugs “made 
available for sale in the State.”107  Therefore, the law did not reach those 
manufactures or wholesalers whose drug will not, at some point, become 
available for sale in Maryland.108 Though HB 631 could affect prices charged 
by out-of-state distributors, the effect would only be applied to prices on drugs 
sold within Maryland.109  The court further held that since HB 631 does not tie 
the price charged in the sales of in-state drugs with the price charged on drugs 
sold out-of-state, it does not have the “practical effect” of regulating commerce 
occurring wholly outside of the state. 
     As for the second tier balancing test, the court also held that AAM failed to 
allege a plausible claim.110  Under this test, if the statute regulates evenly to 
create a legitimate local public interest, and it has only incidental effects on 
interstate commerce, it will be upheld “unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the presumed local benefits.”111
Defenders stated their legitimate interest in enforcing HB 631 was to prevent 
price-gouging in Maryland for essential medicines and to protect the health 
103 Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 
2017) at 8. 
104 Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. V. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 595, 193 L. Ed. 2d 487 (2015). 
105 Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 
2017) at 20. 
106 Id. at 13. 
107 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-801 (b)(1) (LexisNexis 2017). 
108 Id.
109 Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 
2017) at 14. 
110 Id. at 21. 
111 Id. at 20; See generally Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., 401 
F.3d 560, 567 (4th Cir. 2005).
and safety of Maryland residents.112  AAM presented no arguments to refute 
the validity of this legitimate interest.  Ultimately, the court held that given the 
state’s strong interest in protecting its residents, and since AAM had presented 
no evidence to show that “the burden on interstate commerce would clearly 
exceed the local benefits”, the challenge cannot succeed under this test.113  In 
a later entry of final judgment, the court dismissed all claims relating to the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.114
     The Supreme Court has struck down statutes similar to HB 631 under the 
first tier of analysis and the extra territoriality principle.115  In Brown-Forman,
the Court invalidated a provision of a New York law requiring liquor distillers 
selling within the state to affirm that their prices for products sold in state were 
not higher than the lowest price that the same product was sold for in any other 
state during that month.116  Forcing a merchant to seek approval in one state 
before transacting in another directly regulates interstate commerce.117  In this 
case, once a distiller’s posted price takes effect in New York, the New York 
State Liquor Authority must approve the price before it may lower its price for 
the same item in other States.118  Though the statute did limit itself only to the 
sale of liquor in New York, the court found it had the “practical effect” of 
controlling the price of liquor in other states.119
     In Healy, the Court invalidated the Connecticut Liquor Control Act under 
the Commerce Clause.120  Much like in Brown-Forman, the act required out 
of state beer shippers to affirm that the prices of their products sold to 
Connecticut wholesalers weren’t higher than the prices of the same products 
sold in bordering states.121  The Court reasoned that since the law forces out 
of state beer shippers to seek approval for their prices before selling in another 
state, the law was in direct violation of the Commerce Clause.122
     More analogously, the structure of HB 631 is similar to the Virginia statute 
at issue in Star Scientific Inc.123 That statute required cigarette manufacturers 
112 Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 
2017) at 7. 
113 Id.
114 See generally Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 
4347818 (D. Md. 2017). 
115 See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S.; Healy, 491 U.S.  
116 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S.at 575. 
117 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
118 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 583. 
119 Id.
120 Healy, 491 U.S. at 342. 
121 Id. 
122 Id.
123 Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 
2017) at 6. 
to sign a Master Settlement Agreement.124  Non-participating parties had to 
make an escrow payment on each cigarette sold “within the Commonwealth 
whether directly or indirectly through a distributor . . .”125  The Fourth Circuit 
distinguished the case from other similar price parity decisions in Healy and 
Brown-Forman because the statute limited its applicability to only the sale of 
cigarettes “within the Commonwealth.”126  According to the Fourth Circuit, 
the statute did not directly link the prices of cigarettes sold in the state with 
those sold outside of the state.127  Consequently, the statute did not have the 
“practical effect” of controlling prices or transactions that occur completely 
outside of the Virginia.128
     Next, the United States District Court for Maryland addressed the Due 
Process vagueness challenge.  Persuasive precedent in Maryland suggests that 
a law will not be void for vagueness if it “(1) establishes ‘minimal guidelines 
to govern law enforcement,’ and (2) gives reasonable notice of the proscribed 
conduct.”129  There is no clear standard to apply to facial vagueness 
challenges.130  “At the very least, it appears that a facial challenge cannot 
succeed if a ‘statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.’”131  A statute having a 
“plainly legitimate sweep” must have “more than a conceivable 
application.”132   
     AAM argued that the statute did not define the terms “excessive”, “not 
justified” and “appropriate”, in relation to rising prices, requiring further 
explanation to sufficiently understand the terms.133  The court ruled that in 
cases of broad terms, each phrase is context specific, and must be examined 
124 Star Scientific Inc., 278 F.3d at 354. 
125 Id.
126 Id. at 356. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Schleifer by Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 853 (quoting Elliot v. Administrator Animal & 
Plant Health Inspection Serv., 990 F.2d 140, 145 (4th Cir. 1993)).
130 Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 
2017) at 8. 
131 U.S. v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513,518 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Crawford v. Marion 
Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008)). 
132 Martin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 136-37 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting U.S. v. Comstock,
627 F.3d 513,518 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
133 Pl.’s Opp. Mot. Dismiss, Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 
2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 2017) at 12. 
individually.134  Here, the court found that it is “at least very plausible” that 
the combination of these broad terms could render the statute vague.135
     AAM further argued that the term “meaningful” is unconstitutionally 
vague.136  The entire phrase, “no meaningful choice”, is qualified by two sub 
provisions: “(i) The importance of the drug to their health; and (ii) insufficient 
competition in the market for the drug.”137  However, AAM did not challenge 
either of these sub provisions as vague.  Ultimately, the court concluded that 
neither party provided an adequate record to resolve the vagueness issue.138
The court held that AAM’s claim for vagueness was “at least plausible” and 
denied defendants motion seeking dismissal of the vagueness claims.  
     The unclear nature of the void for vagueness question caused the United 
States District Court for Maryland to fall short of a definitive answer with 
regards to HB 631.139  The Supreme Court has held, as a general principle, that 
economic regulations receive a less strict vagueness test “because its subject 
matter is often more narrow,” and because businesses are expected to consult 
relevant legislation in advance of any action.140  Maryland’s act should 
certainly fall within this category of economic regulations receiving a less 
strict vagueness test.  
     Many statutes often use broad terms, and courts have upheld some of these 
statutes against challenges for vagueness.141  While the Supreme Court and 
Maryland have little precedent on the term “unconscionable” in regards to 
vagueness challenges, other jurisdictions have taken up a vagueness challenge 
using the term in some form.142  In Massachusetts, the court upheld a 
134 Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 
2017) at 11; See also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)(“A complaint must allege sufficient 
facts ‘to cross the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”). 
135 Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 
2017) at 9. 
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2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 2017) at 27-28. 
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2017) at 11. 
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141 See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (upholding an 
anti-noise regulation that used the phrase “tends to disturb”); United Companies 
Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 205 (D. Mass. 1998) (rejecting a 
vagueness challenge where the phrase “otherwise unconscionable” was used but 
undefined.). 
142 See generally United Companies Lending Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d at 205.  
vagueness challenge using the term unconscionable.143 In that case, a law 
established that a mortgage lender procuring a loan with rates or terms that 
significantly deviate from industry wide standards that are otherwise 
unconscionable would be guilty of unfair or deceptive trade practices.144
However, the term “otherwise unconscionable” was never defined in the 
law.145  This is in stark contrast to Maryland’s law, which at the very lease 
attempts to further define the term “unconscionable increase”.146
     AAM appealed the District Court of Maryland’s dismissal of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge to the statute, as well as their refusal to enjoin 
enforcement of the statutes for vagueness, to the United States Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.147  The Fourth Circuit reviewed the lower courts dismissal 
de novo, accepting all well pleaded allegations of AAM as true, and “drawing 
all reasonable inferences” in favor of AAM.148  Arguments in the case took 
place on January 24, 2018, with the final decision being handed down on April 
13, 2018.149
     Maryland first argued that the extraterritoriality principal put forth by the 
Supreme Court in Walsh was limited to price affirmation statutes.150  The 
Court disagreed with this finding on the basis that Maryland’s interpretation 
of the language in that case was too narrow.151  Justices Agee and Thacker also 
rejected this notion, conversely holding that the Court’s statement on the 
principal of extraterritoriality is violated if the law at issue “regulates the price 
of any out-of-state transaction, either by its express terms or by its inevitable 
effect.”152  In Walsh, the Maine law at issue created a program where the state 
143 United Companies Lending Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d at 205. 
144 Id.
145 Id. at 206 (quoting Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E. 2d 1370, 1376 (Mass. 
1980). 
146 Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 
2017) at *9-10. 
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150 Ass’n for Acessible Meds, 87 F.3d at 669; See generally Pharmaceutical Research 
& Manufactures of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155, L.Ed.2d 
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rebate program at issue because “unlike price control or price affirmation statutes, 
‘[the program) does not regulate the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its 
express terms or by its inevitable effect.’”). 
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152 Id.; Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669, 123 S.Ct. 1855.
would “attempt to negotiate rebates with drug manufactures to fund the 
reduced price for drugs offered to [program] participants.”153  To contrast, the 
court explained that in Walsh, the Maine law directly affected only 
transactions within Maine, and not the prices manufacturers could charge 
outside of the state.154  Thus, the court found Maryland’s argument 
unpersuasive, and held that the extraterritoriality principle applied not only to 
price affirmation statutes, but also to any statute that regulates the price of any 
out of state transaction.155
     The Court next turned to the merits of AAM’s Dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge.156  AAM first asserted that the law is not triggered by any sale that 
takes place solely within Maryland.157  The United States District Court for 
Maryland found that the law passed the Dormant Commerce challenge 
because the provisions of the law are only triggered where there is a drug made 
available for sale in Maryland.158  However, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with 
this interpretation, finding that the plain language of the law allows Maryland 
to enforce the law against parties in a transaction which may not have resulted 
in any drugs being shipped to Maryland.159  The law defined “essential off-
patent or generic drugs” as any drug “made available for sale in Maryland,” 
and prohibited manufacturers from using the defense that they never sold 
directly to any Maryland consumers. 160 The Court interpreted this language to 
allow the law to apply to sales which take place outside of Maryland, or resale 
transactions with non-Maryland consumers.161  In fact, Maryland admitted that 
the law was intended to reach sales upstream from consumer sales occurring 
in Maryland, meaning the law would potentially effect sales occurring outside 
of Maryland.162  The Court thus found that the District Court erred in relying 
on the “made available for sale” language when it upheld the law.163
     AAM next contended that the law will impact transactions that occur 
wholly outside of Maryland.164  Again, the Court agreed with AAM’s 
153 Id. at 649. 
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interpretation, given that the law’s own terms measures the lawfulness of a 
price increase by the price the manufacturer or wholesaler charges in the initial 
sale of the drug.165  This allowed manufacturers and wholesalers to regulate 
prices according to the initial sale of a drug, which may not have taken place 
in Maryland.  Since the law did not allow retailers to be held liable, only 
manufacturers or wholesalers, the court found that the law specifically targeted 
the upstream pricing and sale of prescription drugs, which both parties agreed 
occurs mostly outside of Maryland.166
     Maryland saw the upstream pricing impact of a state regulation as a 
justification for the laws validity.167  However, the court disagreed citing a 
similar statute in the Freedom Holdings case.168  In that case, a New York 
statute banned the importation of cigarettes manufactured by companies that 
did not comply with a state escrow law.169  The cigarette importers in this case 
argued that the New York law regulated out-of-state commerce by required 
manufacturers to sell higher priced cigarettes “to purchasers in sales 
transactions that occur wholly outside New York.170  The Second Circuit 
disagreed, finding that the effects raised by the importers constitutes no more 
than incidental upstream pricing impact of a state regulation, and that “a 
similar pricing impact might result for any state regulation of a product.”171  In 
Freedom Holdings, the Court ultimately held that price change caused by the 
New York law was the result of natural market forces, not artificially imposed 
by a law in another state.172
     In contrast, the Maryland law at issue attempted to impact prescription drug 
manufactures reaction to market increases, and regulate the prices the 
manufacturers charge for their drugs.173  This, the Court held, is “more than an 
‘upstream pricing impact’ – it is a price control”, which is prohibited by the 
Commerce Clause.174  The Fourth Circuit stated that Maryland can not, even 
pursuant to protecting its consumers from skyrocketing drug prices, impose 
165 Ass’n for Acessible Meds, 87 F.3d at 671.
166 Id. (AAM challenges the law only as it pertains to the out of state sales.). 
167 Id. at 672. 
168 Id.; See generally Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 220 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
169 Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 211-14 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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price controls in this manner, finding that the district court erred by not 
accounting for this impact.175
     Finally, the court addressed the Act’s burden on interstate commerce in 
prescription drugs.176  Since the Act targeted specifically wholesales, and not 
retail pricing, the court found that a similar regulation imposed by another state 
could require prescription drug manufacturers to abide by conflicting state 
requirements.177  If different states enacted a similar law, a manufacturer may 
initiate a transaction that is completely lawful in one state, yet be subject to 
enforcement by another state completely unrelated to the transaction.178  If 
Maryland requires manufacturers to sell drugs at a certain price, but another 
state imposes a different price for the same drug, manufacturers could not 
possibly comply with both laws simultaneously for the same transaction.179  If 
a drug sold to another state later became available for sale in Maryland, the 
Act permitted Maryland to penalize the manufacturer based on the price of the 
drug sold to another state.180  The court found that these competing local 
economic regulations is the exact scenario the Commerce Clause was meant 
to preclude.181  As such, the Fourth Circuit ultimately reversed the district 
court’s dismissal of the claims and remanded the case with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of AAM, thus invalidating the Act.182
     In a last ditch effort to save the law, Maryland filed a writ of certiorari to 
the U.S. Supreme Court on October 19, 2018.183  They first alleged that the 
Court’s extraterritoriality cases concern economic protectionism, not efforts 
to protect consumers from predatory commercial practices.184  Maryland also 
alleged that the price gouging ban is consistent with the Courts prior precedent 
on the matter, and that due to the confusion among circuits over the scope of 
the extraterritoriality principle, the Supreme Court should take the case.185
175 Ass’n for Acessible Meds, 87 F.3d at 673. 
176 Id. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (“Generally speaking, the Commerce 
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at 583-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080. 
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However, on February 19, 2019, the Supreme Court denied cert on the case, 
thus ending Maryland’s long bid to uphold the law.186
     Over the years, several states have proposed solutions to the growing 
concern of rising prescription drug prices including state rebate systems and 
price caps on pharmaceutical drugs.187  While the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the state rebate system, the Federal Circuit halted D.C.’s attempt to regulate 
pharmaceutical prices.188  On the federal level, Congress killed an attempt to 
systematically import drugs from Canada in 2007; however, both the House 
and the Senate introduced new legislation in February of 2017 to increase 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry.189  Each proposal tackles the issue 
of rising drug costs from a different angle and provides alternative methods to 
Maryland’s failed approach.  
A. Maine and D.C. Approaches
     Maine has employed one of the most successful programs to date to combat 
rising drug prices.190  The program operates in conjunction with Medicaid, a 
federal program offering financial assistance to states that reimburse medical 
costs for individuals who otherwise could not afford care.191  Medicaid utilizes 
a prior authorization program.  In order “to reduce prescription drug prices for 
residents of the State,” Maine utilized the prior authorization system with the 
Act to Establish Fairer Pricing for Prescription Drugs (“Maine Rx 
program”).192  The program includes both patients on Medicaid and those not, 
limiting its availability to person with financial or medical need who don’t 
“have a comparable or superior prescription drug benefit plan.”193   
186 Frosh v. Ass’n for Accessible Meds, 139 S.Ct. 1168 (2019).  
187 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681 (2011); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-4551 to 
28-4555 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2008).
188 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., 538 U.S. 644 (2003);Biotechnology Indus.
Org. v. Dist. Of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
189 See Senate Kills Bid to Import Prescription Drugs, MSNBC, (May 7, 2007),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/18530709/#.WmyzXSMrLu0; S. 297, 115th Cong.
(2017); H.R. 749, 115th Cong. (2017).
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191 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., 538 U.S. at 650.
192 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
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     The prior authorization program, established by the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (“OBRA”) of 1990, authorized individual states to 
negotiate rebates from pharmaceutical manufacturers when purchased by a 
Medicaid user.194  The rebates, paid by the pharmaceutical companies, directly 
fund the reduced drug prices for Maine Rx participants.195  The drugs are only 
covered under Medicaid if the manufacturer has agreed to give a rebate.196  If 
a manufacturer decides to reject the rebate, their drugs will be placed on a prior 
authorization list.197  Medicaid will only pay for drugs on the prior 
authorization list if the physician proscribing the medicine gets authorization 
from the Medicaid system.198  This provision is extremely undesirable to 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.  Being placed in this list and forcing physicians 
to gain prior authorization could lead to doctors not proscribing that particular 
drug.  
     Maine’s Rx program is not as expansive as it could be to protect consumers. 
The law does not require manufacturers to join the program, which could lead 
to inaccessibility of some important drugs to consumers in need.199
Additionally, the program does nothing for patients who do not qualify for the 
“financial and medical need” category, but still cannot afford to pay for their 
necessary drugs.200  Finally, even patients with insurance coverage experience 
large bills for expensive medication, which results in higher costs for the 
consumers.201
     In 2005, D.C. took a different approach than Maine’s rebate system, but 
was not as successful.  The D.C. Excessive Pricing Act restricted the pricing 
of excessively priced patented pharmaceuticals.202  This law differed from 
Maryland’s law in that it attempted to regulate only patented drugs.  The law 
implemented a prohibition on drug manufacturers from selling patented 
prescription drugs which resulted in the drug being sold for an excessive 
price.203  While it was ground breaking at its time, the Federal Circuit Court of 
194 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., 538 U.S. at 652. 
195 Id. at 649. 
196 Id.
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D.C. eventually struck down the law because federal patent laws preempted
the Act.204
 The D.C. Excessive Pricing Act’s broad scope caused optimism among its 
supporters.205  The act allowed a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of 
excessive pricing if the wholesale price of the patented drug in D.C. is over 
thirty  percent higher than the price for the same drug in any “high income 
country“ where the product also has a patent.206  High-income countries 
included the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Australia.207  However, 
unlike Maryland’s law, excessive pricing was never explicitly defined in the 
D.C. Excessive Pricing Act.208
B. Recent Federal Attempts
     The recent trend of rising drug prices has also caught the attention of federal 
legislators.  In 2017, two bills were introduced in both Houses aimed at 
increasing competition in the pharmaceutical industry in an attempt to drive 
down prices.209  Rather than outright prohibiting price hikes of pharmaceutical 
drugs, the bills attack some of the root causes of price hikes. Examples of these 
causes include long waits for the approval of an abbreviated new drug from 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) causing a scarcity of certain drugs 
on the market, which in turn, drives prices up.  These abbreviated drugs are 
generic forms of other patented drugs on the market, which increase 
competition. 
     The House’s Lower Drug Costs through Competition Act and the Senate’s 
Increasing Competition in Pharmaceuticals Act are largely similar in 
content.210  There is a significant backlog of abbreviated new drug applications 
for generic drugs, which limits the options on the market.211  The bills outlines 
a general premise that improving the review procedures of abbreviated new 
204 Biotechnology Indus. Org., 496 F.3d at 1374.
205 Serena Lipski, Comment: Excessive Pricing And Pharmaceuticals: Why The 
Federal Patent Act Does Not Preempt State Regulation of Pharmaceutical Prices, 39 
U. Tol. L. Rev. 913, 921 (2008) (“Due to the D.C. Excessive Pricing Act’s broad
scope, it had the potential to be a comprehensive and permanent solution to the high
cost of pharmaceutical drugs”).
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drugs would help improve competition and lower prices for patients, as well 
as establishing a clear timeframe for the FDA to expedite the review of certain 
applications when necessary.212
     The bills edit Chapter V of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act by 
adding the issuance of “Generic Priority Review Vouchers” for generic drugs 
to accelerate the long approval process.213  The Secretary of Health and Human 
Services is directed to review the vouchers no later than 150 calendar days 
after the application has been submitted for review.214  Additionally, the 
vouchers may be transferred between manufacturers, including by sale.215
This could, for example, allow a manufacturer to transfer their voucher to a 
manufacturer of a different drug due to a shortage in supply of the drug on the 
market. The voucher system frees many generic drugs from sluggish 
bureaucracy, resulting in many more drugs hitting the market much faster than 
in the past.  Though the bills have gained bipartisan support across the country, 
neither has passed its respective house.216
C. Increased Need For Federal Legislation
     Maryland tried and failed to implement a groundbreaking solution to 
protect its citizens from the dangers of rising drug costs. Other states took 
notice of Maryland’s attempt, and have attempted to following suit. 
Maryland’s law was groundbreaking in its own right, but only further 
complicated a greater federal regulatory scheme to bring down the prices of 
pharmaceutical drugs.    
     The program employed in Maine simply does not require enough 
accountability from manufacturers for Maryland to adopt a similar plan. For 
instance, Maine’s Rx program does not require manufacturers to enter into 
rebate agreements. By not entering the agreement, the drug is placed on a prior 
authorization list, requiring the doctor to get approval from Medicaid.  This, 
theoretically, discourages doctors from prescribing that particular drug due to 
the extra prior authorization step.  However, while many of these 
manufacturers are national, some are international companies which do 
business all over the world. A decrease in orders for a specific drug in one 
state, or even two is unlikely to have any appreciable effect on these large 
companies.  
     As this issue gained greater national attention, it become more apparent that 
overarching federal legislation on the issue of pharmaceutical drug pricing is 
necessary to increase competition in the generic drug market specifically, and 
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help drive prices down overall.  President Donald Trump has proposed new 
initiatives to help lower drug prices.217  Additionally, his 2016 Presidential 
opponent, Hillary Clinton, outlined a plan to combat “Unjustified price hikes 
for Long-Available Drugs.”218  In March of 2017, Rep. Elijah Cummings of 
Maryland and Rep. Peter Welch of Vermont met with President Trump in the 
White House to discuss this issue, however, nothing has materialized from the 
conversation.  These attempts illustrate the desire to find a solution on the 
federal level. 
     In order to create uniformity among the states, the federal government must 
tackle this issue head on.  To date, we have seen a few examples of individual 
states attempting to take on this legislation, which usually results in lengthy 
litigation.219  If this troubling trend continues, we could be left with individual 
states, and subsequently Federal Circuits, determining which programs work 
and which ones don’t.  The varying political opinions of the circuits could lead 
to more regulation in certain places than in others, making it harder for 
manufacturers to follow the different laws of each given state.  State by State 
solutions would only hinder the overall mission to decrease pharmaceutical 
prices and allow access to more affordable drugs for all Americans.  
D. A Potential Solution for Maryland
     In response to Maryland’s efforts, states around the country have attempted 
to help curb rising prescription drug costs one way or another.220  Many have 
looked to Maryland’s approach to facilitate their own lawmaking process.221
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However, with no current federal legislation in place, Maryland should take 
steps to improve their failed law.   
     Maryland could benefit tremendously from amending the law to reduce 
ambiguities with its enforcement.  In California, the legislature recently passed 
a drug transparency law attempting to combat the same problem as 
Maryland.222  California’s law requires pharmaceutical companies to notify the 
state and health insurers of a rise in price of their medication of 16 percent or 
more over a two-year period.223  Additionally, companies will be required to 
provide justification of the increase to California’s Office of Statewide Health 
Planning and Development.224  The law faced similar backlash to the law in 
Maryland, with drug companies challenging the legislation almost 
immediately, and is currently still pending litigation.225
     Maryland could either try to pass new legislation or simply amend their 
failed law in order to catch price rises before they affect Maryland consumers. 
In regards to the first option, Maryland could follow California’s lead by 
adopting a law that works in conjunction with a new version of their recently 
failed law and requires companies to give notice when a raise in prices is 
coming. Under the recently repealed law, Maryland’s AG made the 
determination of whether or not a drugs price hike is unconscionable.  This 
determination would take time and force consumers to pay the raised price 
until that determination is made. By passing a similar transparency law to 
California, the AG would be notified before the price hike, and could make 
the determination of whether or not the rise in price is unconscionable before 
the law takes effect. This method could also save the State money by limiting 
the number of law suits brought on behalf of Maryland residents against these 
large manufacturing companies, most of whom likely have large capital to 
expend on legal fees. 
     The MD Price Gouging Act was a start, but not the solution to the country’s 
need to ultimately allow for federal legislation.  In the 1970’s, pharmacies 
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substitution of brand name drugs in favor of generic drugs was illegal in most 
of the country.226  In response, Kentucky filed controversial law allowing the 
practice or substitution patented drugs for generic drugs in their state.227
Similar laws began to be passed nationwide, and within eight years, generic 
drug substitution became federal law.228  Similarly since the passage of 
Maryland’s law, sixteen other states have passed laws either addressing price 
gouging, or calling for better transparency from drug companies with regards 
to their price hikes.229  With their recent attempt at a law combating this issue, 
Maryland could have laid the groundwork for a similar path to federal 
legislation.  
     The need for federal legislation on this issue has never been greater.  In the 
United States, nine out of every ten prescriptions filled are for a generic 
drug.230  The limited availability of these drugs, which quite literally save lives 
every day, should be a crime in its own right.  Approaching the issue on a 
state-by-state basis could prove to work in the long run, but could also only 
further complicate compliance from many pharmaceutical companies due to 
the varying laws by state.  That is why federal legislation is needed to allow 
increased, and in some instances expedited access to important generic drugs. 
With more options available on the market, drug prices will be driven down to 
the benefit of millions.  
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